Study of a patient with damage to the hippocampus and surrounding neocortex reveals intact topographical knowledge of his childhood environment. New studies of spatial memory in animals are also giving insight into the process by which spatial memory becomes consolidated over time. Thinking about the conflicting claims of rival theories of hippocampal function often reminds me of the old joke about two Edinburgh housewives who were always shouting at each other across the 'close' from their upper-floor tenement windows. They always disagreed, goes the joke, because they were arguing from different premises. Two theories of hippocampal function -the 'declarative memory' and 'cognitive mapping' theories -are likewise locked in a seemingly irreconcilable debate about whether the hippocampus has a general role in memory function, or one more circumscribed to spatial information. There are, however, one or two cobblestone alleyways where these theories are forced to meet. One meeting point has to do with specifying where relevant memory traces are stored in the brain, others with whether and, if so, how they become stabilised or 'consolidated' over time. A recent study of topographical knowledge by an amnesic patient bears directly on both points. This study is complemented by other recent work on retrograde amnesia and two studies using animals concerning the neural activity that may accompany memory consolidation.
The original cognitive-mapping theory [1] made the strong and testable claim that allocentric spatial maps are created by, and stored in, the hippocampus. The declarative memory theory, on the other hand, asserts that the role of the hippocampus is time-limited; it is held to contribute to a process of 'memory consolidation', but not to be the eventual repository of the traces whose later reactivation are the basis of conscious memory [2] .
Teng and Squire [3] studied a 76 year old man, referred to as E.P., who grew up in the Castro Valley part of the San Francisco Bay area but who moved away in his early adult years. At the age of 68, he suffered a severe attack of Herpes Simplex Encephalitus, and the virus destroyed most of his medial temporal lobe, including the hippocampus on both sides of his brain. A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan revealing the extent of E.P.'s brain damage is shown in Figure 1 . It follows that, if spatial knowledge is created by and stored in the hippocampus, as the cognitive mapping theory implies, E.P.'s memory of the Castro Valley area of his childhood should be lost. In contrast, the declarative memory theory predicts that he would retain memories of his childhood neighbourhood, as these would have been stabilised in the neocortex many years ago. Both theories predict he should have little idea about the neighbourhood to which he has moved since becoming amnesic. As memory for the layout of the streets where we lived as children is, for most of us, unlikely to be very good, it was important to compare E.P. with age-matched control subjects. They should have lived in the same neighbourhood as children, and also have moved away around the same time. The experimenters identified five such people for purposes of comparison.
All six subjects were given four tests of topographical memory and navigation. These were conducted in the form of question-and-answer sessions, rather than as realtime navigation. One test examined the subjects' ability to take routes they were likely to have been used frequently; another was along routes that may have been taken rarely; a third between places for which the direct route, they were told, had been blocked off; and the last involved pointing to specific landmarks. Strikingly, and despite being profoundly amnesic on conventional tests of anterograde and some tests of retrograde amnesia, patient E.P. performed as well as controls. But when tested on his knowledge of the San Diego area of California, where he moved a year after becoming amnesic, he was unable to answer any of the same sorts of questions. The controls, by contrast, all did well.
On the face of it, these results provide striking evidence that the hippocampus cannot be the site, or at least not the only site, of topographical spatial information in humans. Moreover, the results are consistent with the general notion of time-dependent memory consolidation. This is because there would have been sufficient time between E.P.'s childhood and his later onset of amnesia for this topographical information to have become stabilised at neocortical sites, such that neural activity in the cortex alone would be sufficient to re-activate the memory.
There are, however, several features of this experiment that leave room for doubt. First, as Squire has asserted in previous publications ( [4, 5] for example), structural MRI evidence is never as reliable as post-mortem histological assessment. Selected areas of E.P.'s hippocampus may be intact, particularly the more posterior parts that are homologous with regions shown in animals to be important for spatial memory [6] . In fact, inspection of the MRI data raises precisely this possibility. Second, it is striking how well the subjects did on the topographical memory tests -scoring about 70% correct albeit with some scatter across subjects. This level of performance encourages a certain suspension of disbelief until one reads, in the footnotes, that E.P.'s last visit to the Castro Valley area was as recently as 1993 and that one control subject's most recent visit was less than two years ago.
While recognising that finding subjects who have never revisited their childhood homes would not be easy, that such revisits may have occurred repeatedly over the years puts a different complexion on the results. Specifically, spatial memory, like other forms of propositional memory, might be classified as being either 'episodic' in character (about events) or 'semantic' (about facts). We acquire information from the succession of experiences of our lives but, as similar events unfold, we gradually lose the timetags that identify each one uniquely and so accumulate a generic factual knowledge. It has been argued that access to the latter may not require the hippocampus [7] . This is likely to have occurred for the topographical knowledge of all the subjects of the study, amnesic and control alike, such that the tests were actually probing factual knowledge about the Castro Valley area rather than memory for unique events that occurred at specific places within it. On this view, a helpful supplement to the tests reported so far would be to ask E.P. and the control subjects to remember one or more specific events that happened at school, the grocery store or at other places in the neighbourhood.
To proponents of the declarative memory theory, however, neither of these qualifications will carry much weight. First, even if there is some sparing of posterior hippocampus, the extent of damage to adjacent neocortex would likely result in severe deafferentation (loss of neural input). Second, the results of Reed and Squire's recent study of retrograde amnesia [5] , involving numerous tests, indicates that the profile of E.P.'s retrograde amnesia offers no support for a simple episodic-semantic distinction. Specifically, E.P. shows an extensive 'flat' gradient of retrograde amnesia for general semantic knowledge while, paradoxically, displaying quite good autobiographical memory for events of his childhood (and even for personal semantic memory).
The comparison of a range of brain-damaged subjects, some with circumscribed hippocampal damage, some with partial damage to more medial cortical structures as well, and a few with extensive lateral damage strongly suggests that the severity of retrograde amnesia is related to the extent of cortical damage. But this pattern, in turn, implies that the severity of retrograde amnesia has more to do with damaging sites of storage than it has to do with some notional period of consolidation lasting months or years.
Retrograde amnesia has long been investigated by studying people with permanent and selective brain damage, or animals given circumscribed lesions of these areas under experimental conditions. Such studies can establish that the integrity of a brain area is relevant for memory storage or for consolidation over time; but they tell us little about the neural mechanisms within those areas that are responsible for either process. Bontempi and colleagues [8] have sought direct evidence for timedependent neural activity by looking at regional glucose utilisation in various brain areas of rats during a spatial memory test conducted shortly (5 days) or long (25 days) after a learning experience. In each of three areas of the hippocampal formation -hippocampus, subiculum and entorhinal cortex -there was a 15-20% decrease in glucose utilisation at the longer memory delay interval, unless the conditions of the memory test were changed from those of original learning. In contrast, activity in frontal, temporal and anterior cingulate cortex showed an increase in glucose utilisation at the longer memory delay The implication of these observations would appear to be that hippocampal neural activity is higher when memories must be retrieved soon after testing, while neocortical activity is higher when memories are retrieved later on. Notice that in this kind of experiment, unlike lesion studies, the brain areas of interest are present and working at all stages of the experiment -a desirable feature if we are to understand the neural mechanisms underlying consolidation. By combining this kind of study with pharmacological manipulations, it may be possible to get a handle on what neurotransmitter systems are active during long-term memory consolidation.
These observations need not imply, however, that differential neural activity is causally related to changes in memory performance. A complementary approach has recently been introduced [9] involving the reversible inactivation of the hippocampus for periods of as long as a week. Riedel et al. [9] calibrated their technique, which is based on the chronic infusion of a water-soluble antagonist of AMPA-type glutamate receptors, using a combination of electrophysiology and 2-deoxyglucose autoradiography. They then went on to describe several behavioural experiments, including one in which the hippocampus was 'switched-off' for a week and then 'switched-on' again after the end of several days training in a watermaze.
When the animals were tested 16 days later, with the hippocampus again working normally, the animals that had sustained hippocampal inactivation were found to be poorer at remembering the location within the water maze of the hidden escape platform than control animals who had received artificial cerebrospinal fluid. As the animals were neither trained nor tested during the period of hippocampal inactivation, the most natural interpretation is that switching this brain structure off for 7 days interfered with a memory consolidation process. The enhanced neural activity observed by Bontempi et al. [8] for several days after spatial memory training may, therefore, be causal with respect to neocortical consolidation, although alternative interpretations of the inactivation findings are yet to be ruled out.
The observation [3] that E.P. shows intact topographical knowledge for a place that he learned about as a child and had the chance to remind himself about occasionally thereafter is a challenge to the notion, implicit in cognitive mapping theory, that all topographic spatial knowledge is stored in the hippocampus. But where that information is stored and difficulties that have haunted attempts to address the process of neocortical memory consolidation in humans remain as great as ever. It will be some while before peace reigns in the close.
